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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISI ON NOTICE 
Name: Lopez, Awilda Facility: Albion CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 96-0-1200 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
07-180-18 B 
Appearances: Joanne Best Esq. 
Orleans County Public Def ender 
1 South Main Street 
Suite 5 
Albion, New York 14411 
Decision appealed: July 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24-months. 
Board Member(s) Smith, Alexander 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received November 20, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
. Plan. 
=r=t=~~~7~The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
0'~rmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ _ _ 
Commissioner 
~~ _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Fin~ings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!!.!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related St.aternent of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ~te findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ~~9 tJ,'°t-~ . 
Distrihution: Appeals Unit -Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - lnst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002<B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Lopez, Awilda DIN: 96-G-1200  
Facility: Albion CF AC No.:  07-180-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 3) 
 
Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 
24-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in 
that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. Appellant 
contends she has an excellent institutional record and release plan, but all the Board did was to 
look only at the instant offense. 2) conducting the interview by video-conference is illegal. 3) 
appellant incurred prejudice by not being allowed access to the entire contents of her parole file. 
4) the 24 month hold is excessive. 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, she will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that her 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007).   
 
     As the weight to be assigned each statutory factor is within the Board’s discretion, it committed 
no error by emphasizing the severity of the inmate’s offense over the other factors it properly 
considered.  See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 
N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. 
Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 
A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385, 
772 N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 2004); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 
(1st Dept. 1998). 
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         The Board may cite the failure of the inmate to acknowledge the impact of the criminal conduct 
on the victim. Gaito v New York State Board of Parole, 238 A.D.2d 634, 655 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dept 
1997);  Romer v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005). 
     The Board may consider the vulnerability of the victims. Bockeno v New York State Board of 
Parole,  227 A.D.2d 751, 642 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (3d Dept. 1996); Romer v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 
804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005); Yourdon v New York State Division of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1065, 
820 N.Y.S.2d 366 (3d Dept. 2006). 
   “[T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by 
considering remorse and insight.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704 (2000).  Remorse is a permissible factor.  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018) (minimization of crimes); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 
A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018) (limited expression of remorse). 
    The Board may consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying 
parole.  See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). 
    The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
     The use of teleconferencing technology to conduct parole release interviews is permissible.  It 
does not prejudice the inmate and is consistent with the requirement that a parole candidate be 
“personally interviewed.”  Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 
2006); Matter of Mack v Travis, 283 A.D.2d 700, 723 N.Y.S.2d 905 (3d Dept. 2001); Matter of 
Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000); see also Yourdon v. 
Johnson, No. 01-CV-0812ESC, 2006 WL 2811710, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006); Boddie v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
    An inmate has no constitutional right to the information in her parole file, Billiteri v U.S. Board 
of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976), and generally is not entitled to confidential 
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material, Matter of Justice v. Comm’r of New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 130 
A.D.3d 1342, 15 N.Y.S.3d 853 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Perez v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dept. 2002); Matter of Macklin v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 821, 
711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 2000).  The Board may consider confidential information.  Matter 
of Molinar v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 
2014).The Board may designate certain parole records as confidential. See Matter of Wade v. 
Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (citing Public Officers Law § 
87(2)(a), (f); Executive Law § 259-k(2); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8000.5(c)(2)(i)(a), (b)). 
    The Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the 
Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).1  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or 
improper. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
                                                 
1 For interviews conducted before the 2017 amendments, the provision was found at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3 
(d) (2014) 
